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RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION:  SOME PROBLEMS FOR 
ORIGINALISTS (AND EVERYONE ELSE, TOO) 
Barry Friedman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In its 2000 decision in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court 
held that the Congress of the United States lacks legislative power to 
provide a remedy in the federal courts for gender-based violence.1  
The reasoning of the Court was straightforward.  Congress could not 
adopt the bill as an exercise of its enumerated commerce power be-
cause “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not . . . economic 
activity,” and thus do not “substantially affect[] interstate com-
merce.”2  This economic-noneconomic line was necessary because 
“[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly na-
tional and what is truly local.”3  Nor was the law valid under the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Assuredly it was the case that “state-sponsored 
gender discrimination violates equal protection,”4 and Congress 
plainly possessed power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to “‘enforce,’ by ‘appropriate legislation’ the constitutional 
guarantee” of equality.5  Yet, again, there were necessary limitations 
on such power, most notably the one found in the 1883 Civil Rights 
Cases, which held that Congress lacked power under Section 5 to re-
gulate private rather than state actors.6  The public-private line was 
required (this should start to sound familiar) “to prevent the Four-
teenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers’ carefully crafted 
balance of power between the States and the National Government.”7  
Congress’s remedy against gender-motivated violence failed because 
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 1 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
 2 Id. at 609, 613. 
 3 Id. at 617–18. 
 4 Id. at 620. 
 5 Id. at 619 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997)). 
 6 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 7 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620 (citing Flores, 521 U.S. at 520–24). 
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it “visit[ed] no consequence whatever on any [state] . . . official.”8  
The Court conceded that if the allegations of gender-motivated vio-
lence in the case were true—and they were hardly atypical ones—“no 
civilized system of justice could fail to provide . . . a remedy.”9  
“[U]nder our federal system,” however, that “remedy must be pro-
vided by [the states], and not by the United States.”10 
The popular and academic reaction to Morrison was all over the 
map.  Conservatives generally were happy—but not all of them, since 
some had supported the legislation invalidated by the Court.11  Many 
liberals were hyperbolic, displaying deep anger with the decision.12  
Still, some liberal voices agreed with the Court, or thought that the 
decision was not unwarranted.13  Given subsequent events, notably the 
trimming of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism initiative, the result in 
Morrison may not seem to matter much.  But the bases for the Court’s 
ruling—its reaffirmation of the Civil Rights Cases, and the limited 
conception of congressional power—have the potential to reverber-
ate. 
Rather than entering the already-crowded field on whether the 
Morrison Court decided the case correctly, what I seek to do here in-
stead is highlight the potentially enormous complexity involved in 
answering the question.  Following the Court’s decision, commenta-
 
 8 Id. at 626. 
 9 Id. at 627. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Why You Can’t Sue Your Rapist in Federal Court, NAT’L J., May 20, 2000, 
at 1577 (“The Framers clearly did not intend to let Congress regulate everything.  And if 
rape and domestic violence have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to justify fed-
eral regulation, then so does all violent crime, and so do most other human activities.”).  
But a few Republican senators expressed frustration with the Morrison decision.  See, e.g., 
Linda Greenhouse, The Court v. Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A1 (quoting Sena-
tor Arlen Specter as declaring that he took “umbrage at what the court has said,” particu-
larly in Morrison). 
 12 See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001) 
(concluding that the Court, in invalidating federal legislation like the statute at issue in 
Morrison, is “using its authority to diminish the proper role of Congress”); Herman 
Schwartz, Assault on Federalism Swipes at Women, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2000, at M1 (calling 
Morrison “another salvo” in the Supreme Court’s “jihad against the federal government”); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23 (noting the 
“remarkable period of right-wing judicial activism”). 
 13 See, e.g., Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus:  Explaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tol-
erate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 
1315–16 (2002) (noting that most of the Rehnquist Court federalism decisions “have 
been narrow in scope”); Editorial, States’ Business, WASH. POST, May 16, 2000, at A20 (as-
serting that “in this one, the court got it right.  If Congress could federalize rape and as-
sault, it’s hard to think of anything it couldn’t.”); Anthony Lewis, Court and Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2000, at A15 (admitting that Morrison was a “close case”). 
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tors questioned whether the Court’s conception of American federal-
ism was correct, and whether violence against women was properly 
characterized as a private act, rather than a failure of state remedial 
schemes.14  But there are even more profound and difficult questions 
that arise if one takes seriously the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, both at its inception and thereafter.  Virtually none of 
this complexity was evident on the face of the Court’s opinion, and 
much of it was missing from the debate that occurred in its after-
math. 
What, after all, explains the Court’s blithe (and longstanding) as-
sumption that women’s equality is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the first place?  In her days as an activist for women’s 
equality, Ruth Bader Ginsburg conceded that those who adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment had intentionally put to one side the issue of 
gender equality in favor of more pressing concerns over race.15  Yet, 
as is familiar to all, in the 1970s the Court—assisted by Ginsburg-as-
litigator—extended the heightened protections of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to women.16  How precisely did the Constitution change 
in this way?17  Similarly, although there has been a robust debate both 
 
 14 See Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism:  The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and 
Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 380–83 (2002) (noting the extent of Congress’s find-
ings on state failures to address domestic violence and criticizing the Court’s approach as 
a “radical new understanding of congressional power”); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
Equal Protection by Law:  Federal Antidiscrimination Law after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE 
L.J. 441, 445–46 (2000) (arguing that Morrison, along with Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62 (2000), marked a retreat from the antidiscrimination jurisprudence that had 
developed in the four decades since Brown v. Board of Education). 
 15 Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Jane Picker, The Equal Rights Amendment:  A Discussion at 
The Ford Foundation 12 (May 22, 1972) (transcript available in the New York University 
Law School Library). 
 16 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying heightened scrutiny to a state beer 
law that discriminated between young men and young women); Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (striking down a discriminatory mili-
tary benefits regulation on the basis of heightened scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 
(1971) (claiming to use rational basis scrutiny, while striking down an estate law that dis-
criminated between male and female heirs). 
 17 For discussion of rationales for expanding the Equal Protection Clause’s scope, see Reva 
B. Siegel, She the People:  The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948–49 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has incorporated 
sex discrimination into its Equal Protection jurisprudence by analogizing sex to race, ra-
ther than recognizing sex discrimination protections as rooted in the constitutional text).  
See also Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951 (2002) (arguing 
that the constitutional text—specifically the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments—
should provide guidance in determining the forms of discrimination barred by the Equal 
Protection Clause); David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1154–56 (1998) (asserting that the rise in constitutional sex dis-
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on and off the Court regarding the proper application of federalist 
principles in Section 5 and Commerce Clause cases alike, virtually 
none of this discussion has acknowledged how understandings of fe-
deralism have seesawed throughout American history.  Opponents of 
the Morrison majority’s view of American federalism typically stress the 
transformational effect of the Civil War Amendments.18  Yet, they pay 
almost no attention to the fact that the nation quickly turned its back 
on those amendments, motivated in part by a reluctance to substan-
tially abandon antebellum understandings of the American federal 
structure.  Does the swift de facto reversal of Reconstruction count 
for nothing?  And if so, why?  Is it because those post-Reconstruction 
understandings themselves were erased by the subsequent events of 
1937?  Or was the determinative factor the rediscovery of racial equal-
ity in the 1950s and 1960s?  How, in short, ought a constitutional in-
terpreter deal with these profound swings in constitutional meaning, 
recorded in constitutional doctrine and history, but not in constitu-
tional text?  Should they count for naught? 
This Article addresses the difficult task any constitutional inter-
preter inevitably faces once she determines to take the entire docu-
ment into account, not just a part of it.  That problem is exacerbated 
enormously because the Constitution was enacted over time and not all 
at one time.  Both of these problems—holistic interpretation and 
construction over time—are illuminated by focusing on the meaning 
of the Constitution in light of the Civil War Amendments. 
A central, though hardly exclusive, target of this Article is the pos-
sibility and the sincerity of originalist interpretation.  The last thirty 
to forty years have seen a crescendo of support, at least in some quar-
ters, for construing the Constitution in light of its “original under-
standing.”19  Obviously, if originalism is the proper methodology for 
 
crimination protections without a formal amendment reflects the relative unimportance 
of constitutional text). 
 18 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation:  Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Con-
stitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1259 (2001) (questioning why the Fourteenth Amendment is 
seen as modifying the Eleventh Amendment but not Congress’s Article I Commerce 
Clause powers); Siegel, supra note 17, at 997–1003, 1039–44 (discussing how discrimina-
tion against women has often been justified by federalism concerns, and suggesting that 
the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments together provide for expanded national au-
thority to combat sex discrimination). 
 19 See generally, ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) (providing an overview 
of the politicization of the Supreme Court and the competing theories and interests that 
judges take into account when making their decisions, and concluding that a successful 
theory of interpretation cannot depart from the original meaning of the Constitution); 
Steven G. Calabresi, Introduction to ORIGINALISM:  A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 1–40 
(Steven G. Calabresi ed. 2007) (describing the debate over originalism and concluding 
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constitutional interpretation, then this methodology must be applied 
to all parts of the Constitution.  In deciding cases like Morrison, the 
Court rightfully looked back to the Founding of the nation in 1787.  
But it also must take full account of Reconstruction, the nation’s Sec-
ond Founding, and the time when the Fourteenth Amendment itself 
was adopted.  As a nation and a constitutional culture, we wallow 
deep in the waters of the Founding era.  Yet, the rich history of the 
Civil War Amendments has barely been integrated into our national 
ethos.  This is perfectly understandable.  The period is historically 
rich and deeply complicated; there are no easy stories there.  But it 
also is unfortunate.  One cannot talk about interpreting the Constitu-
tion without considering what it means to interpret it all together, 
across text and across time.  This sort of interpretation will prove 
tricky for everyone, but especially for originalists. 
I begin by sketching the odd neglect of the Reconstruction 
Amendments as a matter of constitutional interpretation and inter-
pretive methodology both.  Then, in what is the heart of the Article, I 
detail five specific problems that repairing this neglect pose for any 
interpretive theory (but particularly originalism).  First, there is the 
problem of interpretation.  For a variety of reasons I detail, develop-
ing an original understanding of the Constitution of 1787 is a snap 
compared to making sense of the Second Founding.  Second is the 
problem of integration:  how does one render a coherent interpreta-
tion of a Constitution that has clauses layered atop others over time, 
clauses that sometimes trump earlier ones, but more often simply 
modify them in elusive ways?  Third is the problem of rejection.  By 
the early 1880s the country largely had turned its back on the work of 
the Reconstruction Congress.  Chattel slavery had ended, but in many 
places that was about it.  What does one do with constitutional provi-
sions that fall into desuetude?  Fourth, there is the problem of revi-
sion:  as the country turned its back on the original commitments of 
the Civil War Amendments, the courts found altogether new mean-
ings in the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, interpretations 
largely constructed to protect the interests of property holders and 
interstate businesses.  These interpretations, arguably quite different 
from the original understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments, 
were dominant for almost half a century.  Can longstanding revision-
 
originalist constitutional interpretation is the most effective way to interpret the Constitu-
tion); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) (ex-
plaining why originalism is the prevailing form of constitutional interpretation); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 917 (2008) (arguing that originalism produces desirable results). 
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ist understandings themselves become embedded in the Constitu-
tion?  And what happens if then, over time, they too are rejected?  
Fifth, there is the question of recovery.  Beginning in the twentieth 
century, renewed concern about civil rights led to a rebirth of atten-
tion to the original commitments of the Civil War Amendments.  Can 
rejected original understandings be reborn, and if so, how should 
they then be understood—in the terms of their original naissance, or 
their renaissance? 
As I believe will become apparent, these problems, taken together, 
are somewhat devastating for a purely originalist methodology.  Yet, 
importantly, they do not make life comfortable for any theory of in-
terpretation.  It is commonplace (and perfectly understandable) for 
constitutional interpreters of all stripes to seek consistency, to try to 
set a straight course between ratification and the present.  As the 
checkered history of the Reconstruction Amendments demonstrates, 
however, in reality there has been much tacking to and fro.  How 
does one interpret the Constitution coherently given this varied 
course? 
In closing, I will argue that constitutional interpreters necessarily 
have to engage in synthesis.  Any serious interpreter of the Constitu-
tion has to have something sensible to say about the back and forth of 
constitutional meaning throughout history.  One cannot simply ig-
nore tidal changes in the interpretation of the Constitution.  I will 
make the point that as lawyers, when we synthesize, we do so looking 
backward, not forward.  Perhaps it is inevitable that backward synthe-
sis involves the drawing of straight lines, even if they are not true to 
history.  If this is so, then constitutional interpretation is not so much 
an exercise in reconstructing our past, as in tracing our way back to it 
as best we can.  Still, there are better and less acceptable means of do-
ing so. 
History is empiricism of a sort, and a useful analogy might be an 
empirical one.  When assessing claims of cause and effect, empiricists 
use regression analysis.  They take a set of data points and do the best 
job they can fitting a straight line to it.  Some points lie right on the 
line, some far above or below it, but the best line is one that mini-
mizes the overall deviation from the data that exists.  The line, in this 
sense, is not some fictitious straight line from a foundational moment 
that determines the present.  Rather, it is an understanding of the 
present that provides the best account of all the points in the past. 
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II.  THE UNFORTUNATE NEGLECT OF THE RECONSTRUCTION 
AMENDMENTS 
Reconstruction, America’s Second Founding, remains curiously 
neglected as a subject of constitutional exploration.  Even assuming 
any serious theory of constitutional interpretation can pick and 
choose the clauses it wishes to consider, it is difficult to see how that 
choice reasonably could fail to include the Civil War Amendments.  
Yet, for those engaged in the endeavor of original understanding—as 
well as for most other methods of constitutional interpretation—
those amendments remain a bit of a frontier, relatively unexplored 
and little understood. 
Although making this claim involves the always-perilous task of 
proving a negative, one doubts the point is likely to elicit a serious 
challenge.  This is not an assertion that the Civil War Amendments 
themselves have not played a sufficient role in American constitu-
tionalism.  Obviously the Fourteenth Amendment alone has been 
deeply significant to constitutional law at least since the 1880s (albeit 
with its high and low points).  Nor is it necessarily that there is a 
dearth of scholarship regarding Reconstruction.  There has been a 
great deal of good work done on what happened in the late 1860s 
and what the nation expected out of the Civil War Amendments.20  
Rather, the claim is that Reconstruction has inadequately influenced 
the direction of constitutional law itself, particularly as compared 
with the original founding.  Constitutional doctrine imperfectly un-
derstands Reconstruction.21 
 
 20 See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:  FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE 
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 42–45 (1988) (detailing the political climate and goals during the 
proposal and adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments); Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revo-
lutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 
864 (1986) (analyzing “the Republican theory of national civil rights enforcement author-
ity under the thirteenth amendment, which the Civil Rights Act was intended to imple-
ment, and the fourteenth amendment. . . . [and finding that] the Supreme Court ulti-
mately rejected the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Reconstruction 
amendments suggested by the Republican theory of civil rights enforcement”). 
 21 Fairness requires conceding that original understandings of the Founding may not really 
have influenced constitutional law significantly either.  Talk of the originalist methodol-
ogy is abundant.  Conferences are held, and articles and books written, imploring courts 
to be originalist (or exploring the pitfalls of originalism).  Sometimes it seems there is far 
more attention to the question of whether original understandings ought to be pursued, 
rather than attention to actually pursuing them.  As Robert Post and Reva Siegel explain 
it, originalism is a political movement, an ideology, much more than an attention to in-
terpretive understanding.  Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice:  The 
Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).  Still, there is no denying some 
broader attention in Supreme Court decisions to original meanings of the Founding era.  
See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
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Although it is difficult to establish conclusively a relative lack of at-
tention to understandings of the Civil War Amendments, there are 
some significant data points.  Take the Supreme Court, where the 
strategy with regard to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment at 
critical moments has been one akin to confession and avoidance.  
Did those who adopted the Equal Protection Clause intend to pro-
hibit racial discrimination in schools?  The Court found no meaning-
ful answer in the history (or perhaps not the one it wanted), so it 
quickly moved on to other reasons why such discrimination was 
unlawful.22  Similarly, did the Privileges or Immunities Clause, or the 
Due Process Clause, incorporate the provisions of the existing Bill of 
Rights?  The history appeared indeterminate (or problematic), so the 
Court went its own way and adopted the approach of selective incor-
poration.23  As serious works of scholarship have made clear, the his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment actually had a lot to say about 
each of these questions, albeit not in the terms the Court was willing 
to hear.24  So, that inconvenient history was simply cast to one side. 
In the public realm, the relative deficit of attention to Reconstruc-
tion is even more telling.  A trip to the bookstore reveals a country 
practically awash in the original founding; biographies and histories 
for the popular educated reader abound.  In comparison, Recon-
struction is a diaspora, and the Gilded Age that followed lost almost 
entirely.  In the popular mind, American history seems to run 
through Lincoln straight to Theodore Roosevelt, if not his cousin 
Franklin. 
Remarkably, the same unfortunate neglect seems pervasive among 
those who would interpret the Constitution using an originalist me-
thodology.  The present obsession in some quarters with originalism 
can be traced back to the rise of conservativism in the 1970s and 
 
 22 The Court in Brown v. Board of Education acknowledged that reargument had focused on 
the circumstances surrounding the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption, but explicitly re-
fused to “turn the clock back.”  347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).  For a historical argument that 
Brown actually was consistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947 (1995).  For a critique, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional 
Theory:  A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995). 
 23 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947) (holding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment could not automatically incorporate the original Bill of Rights since “[n]othing has 
been called to [the Court’s] attention that either the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or the states that adopted intended its due process clause to draw within its scope 
the earlier amendments to the Constitution”). 
 24 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 215–18 
(1998) (arguing that the issue of incorporation is complicated by basic differences in how 
the original Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are structured). 
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1980s.25  Yet, since that time originalists—with a few notable excep-
tions such as John Harrison, Akhil Amar (really a textualist), Michael 
McConnell, and Randy Barnett—have devoted little if any attention 
to the Second Founding.26 
Though it is easy to see why Reconstruction has been neglected—
more on this in a moment—the impact of doing so should be readily 
apparent.  The period after the Civil War involved telling debates 
about one of America’s deepest commitments:  equality.  The very 
conception of citizenship, of political and civil existence in the Amer-
ican polity, was detailed and discussed at great length.  There were 
intricate analyses of what rights state and national citizens possessed.  
The country watched closely as Congress debated legislative and con-
stitutional measures, voter turnout was high, and elections were 
fought and won (or lost) on the perceived justice (or injustice) of 
congressional statutory and constitutional decisions.27  These issues of 
equality, citizenship, and foundational rights have been critical to 
American political development over at least the last half century.  
The failure to devote the same attention to this founding moment as 
has been given to 1787 is almost unimaginable. 
One perfectly plausible reason for the relative inattention of ori-
ginalist scholars is that a focus on the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
cousins would invigorate the constitutional movement of those on 
 
 25 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION ch.9 (2009) (de-
scribing the rise of originalism in the years following the Warren Court); JONATHAN 
O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 111–60 (2005) (discussing the re-
vival of originalism led by Raoul Berger in the 1970s and the favored status of originalism 
in Edward Meese’s Department of Justice during the 1980s); Post & Siegel, supra note 21, 
at 545–46 (2006) (discussing the contributions to originalism of the “pioneer conservative 
academics”); see also STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 
135–80 (2008) (providing an overview of the rise of conservatism in law schools). 
 26 See generally AMAR, supra note 24 (devoting half of his book to a discussion of Reconstruc-
tion); RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004) (discussing how an originalist understanding of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires a dramatically expanded reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause); 
John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375 
(2001) [hereinafter Harrison, Lawfulness] (examining the legality of the Reconstruction 
Amendments); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1385, 1460–61 (1992) [hereinafter Harrison, Privileges or Immunities] (analyzing the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause in reference to the Reconstruction Amendments); 
McConnell, supra note 22 (discussing originalism in the context of desegregation and 
thus the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 27 See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 
427, 456–57 (2007) (referring to the vaguely-worded Amendment as “a new addition to 
the Constitution, a campaign proposal for the 1866 elections and an armistice to be im-
posed on the defeated South”). 
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the political left.  Though there are originalist stirrings on the ideo-
logical left, in the main the enterprise of original understanding has 
been one for conservatives.  Yet, the bold themes of Reconstruction, 
the equality and rights of American citizens and those within our ju-
risdictional grasp, certainly resonate most with the left’s agenda.  But 
do not be too certain that an originalist examination of Reconstruc-
tion necessarily or always favors the left.  While Reconstruction be-
spoke a commitment to equality and foundational rights, those con-
ceptions had their limits, most notably in generally excluding women 
from the vision, and ultimately in separating civil and political equal-
ity from social equality.28  While the amount of scholarship tying Re-
construction’s understanding to specific constitutional claims is not 
what it should be, some of the extant work is conservative in nature 
and makes points that if adopted into doctrine might roll back the 
scope of existing constitutional protections.29  There is something in 
the original understanding of the Civil War Amendments for scholars 
of every ideological stripe. 
If we are to interpret the Constitution in light of how it originally 
was understood, it seems unavoidable that the devotion to original 
understanding must extend to all parts of the Constitution.  In the 
aftermath of a chilling war, the American Constitution itself experi-
enced a moment of profound re-evaluation and rebirth.  Yet, that 
moment remains remarkably obscured today. 
III.  INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS 
A.  The Difficulty of Interpretation 
The first problem with incorporating Reconstruction into the ori-
ginalist canon is the sheer difficulty of doing so.  Critics of originalism 
 
 28 See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 242–48 (4th ed. 
2000) (citing legislative history supporting the proposition that the Framers generally did 
not intend to protect social rights through the Fourteenth Amendment); Siegel, supra 
note 17, at 964–65 (noting that “the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were not ter-
ribly interested in enfranchising women”).  See generally, Ward Farnsworth, Women Under 
Reconstruction:  The Congressional Understanding, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229 (2000) (discussing 
how the framers explicitly intended to exclude women’s equality issues from the scope of 
the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 29 See, e.g., Harrison, Lawfulness, supra note 26, at 375–80 (describing defects in how the Re-
construction Amendments were ratified and concluding that, while the Amendments are 
still legally valid, they did not represent popular national sentiment); John Harrison, State 
Sovereign Immunity and Congress’s Enforcement Powers, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 353, 399–400 [he-
rinafter Harrison, Sovereign Immunity] (suggesting that Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 
(1976), was wrongly decided and that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment should 
not limit States’ Eleventh Amendment protections). 
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in the context of the original Founding have gone to great lengths to 
establish how difficult the task can be.  Yet, compared to discerning 
the proper construction of the Reconstruction Amendments, the sim-
ilar search regarding the Founding era is a tea party.  Materials are 
unavailable, their meaning is obscure; it is unclear that originalist me-
thodologies developed to deal with the Founding are even coherent 
when addressed to Reconstruction.  None of this excuses the lack of 
effort to take full account of Reconstruction, but it does help explain 
the failure. 
First, it is worth addressing the possibility that the interpretive hi-
erarchy regarding original intent and understanding may need to be 
reversed when it comes to Reconstruction.  In its initial formulation, 
the originalist insistence was upon elucidating the “intentions” of 
those who framed the Constitution.30  This idea of original intention 
proved elusive for a variety of reasons, including the professed se-
crecy of the Constitutional Convention, the incoherence of the idea 
of collective intent, and the simple impossibility of discovering any 
germane original intentions as applied to many modern questions.31  
Thus, as is well known, the idea of “original intention” quickly gave 
ground to the broader notion of “original understanding.”32  Today, 
 
 30 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–66 (1977) (analyzing the history and importance of “orig-
inal intention”); Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Asso-
ciation (July 9, 1985), in ORIGINALISM:  A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47 (Steven G. Ca-
labresi ed. 2007) (advocating that judges adhere to the intentions of the founders); 
Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 
(1988) (discussing the evolution of the “jurisprudence of original intent”).  For back-
ground of the rise and refinement of originalism, see Balkin, supra note 27, at 444–46, 
and see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, (GWU Leg. Studs. Res. Pa-
per No. 393, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1090282. 
 31 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 214 (1980) (discussing how the founders’ intentions are difficult to ascertain and 
aggregate); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate:  A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1085, 1087–97 (1989) (summarizing various lines of attack on original intent includ-
ing the ambiguity of such intent); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Origi-
nal Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 887–88 (1985) (arguing that the Founders themselves 
did not expect the Constitution to be interpreted through an originalist lens); Mark 
Tushnet, The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of the Framers, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 217, 217–18 
(1987) (describing criticisms of the “original intention” method for interpreting the Con-
stitution). 
 32 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.9 (describing switch to advocacy for jurisprudence of 
original understandings); Barnett, supra note 19, at 621 (defining originalim as seeking to 
ascertain “the objective original meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the 
words used in the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment”). 
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the preference for societal understandings over the intentions of the 
Framers in Philadelphia is almost universal.33 
Nonetheless, there is a reasonable argument that the move to 
original understandings was an error, for the simple reason that orig-
inal intentions actually are more revealing.  The discussions in Phila-
delphia were a relatively candid affair.  By the time the proposed 
Constitution hit the street, however, posturing often sullied the de-
bates in ways that make reliance on the original understanding trou-
blesome.  Those who opposed the Constitution, the anti-Federalists, 
sought to invoke fears about the “consolidation” of the central gov-
ernment vis-à-vis the states.34  To this end, they often made claims 
about the Constitution they happily would abandon once ratification 
occurred.35  Similarly, Federalists anxious to quell anti-Federalist wor-
ries minimized the import of the Constitution in ways they too would 
deny in later years.36  It is unclear that one can set an interpretive 
compass by what in the main were often fairly disingenuous or over-
stated explanations of constitutional meaning. 
Second, even assuming the proper focus is on the original under-
standing of those doing the ratifying, when it comes to Reconstruc-
tion the tools for constructing this original understanding are ex-
tremely difficult to come by, if not nonexistent.  As Larry Kramer has 
pointed out, the shift from a focus on intentions to one of original 
understandings was not driven entirely by theory.37  Rather, it was 
aided by the availability of critical interpretive resources.  The Docu-
mentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution was published in 
 
 33 See Barnett, supra note 19, at 620 (declaring that “originalism has itself changed—from 
original intention to original meaning.  No longer do originalists claim to be seeking the 
subjective intentions of the framers”); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conven-
tions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 554 (2003) (discussing how original understanding is often 
portrayed as being an “objective” interpretive methodology). 
 34 See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE:  A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 28–29 (2007) (noting that Anti-
Federalists repeatedly attacked the Constitution’s terms as ambiguous and likely to lead 
to overreaching by the federal government); Brutus, Essay No. XII (Feb. 14, 1788), re-
printed in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 426–27 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (claim-
ing that the federal courts would expand Congress’s powers so that “the states [will] lose 
[their] rights, until they become so trifling and unimportant, as not to be worth having”). 
 35 See PURCELL, supra note 34, at 33 (describing how many Anti-Federalists who had criti-
cized the Constitution for granting the central government “unbounded” powers later in-
sisted that the text “was both precise and sharply restrictive”). 
 36 For example, Hamilton’s claim that the Necessary and Proper Clause did not provide the 
federal government with additional substantive authority—expounded during the ratifi-
cation debates—soon gave way to a more expansive interpretation of the Clause. 
PURCELL, supra note 34, at 32. 
 37 Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 909–
10 (2008). 
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1978.  “Suddenly,” wrote Kramer, “everybody could be an historian of 
ratification, because a vast reserve of primary sources were available 
in neatly bound volumes.”38  Now, finally, the tools were at hand with 
which to construct an original understanding. 
Yet, even today the tools necessary to construct the original of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are difficult to obtain if not entirely lacking.  
There are the congressional debates over Reconstruction, to be sure, 
those seemingly endless and dense discussions that prove frustratingly 
difficult to interpret coherently (more on this too in just a moment).  
But what of ratification, the process that proves so edifying to origi-
nalist scholars of the founding?  As the historian James Edward Bond 
noted in his 1997 No Easy Walk to Freedom, a discussion of ratification 
in the southern states, “[t]here are very few studies of the state ratifi-
cation debates on the Fourteenth Amendment.”39  This is hardly a 
surprise, for—as Michael Kent Curtis explains—“[m]ost of the state 
legislatures that considered the Fourteenth Amendment either kept 
no record of their debates, or their discussion was so perfunctory that 
it shed little light on their understanding of its meaning.”40  Of 
course, one is not limited to formal debates.  There are newspaper 
chronicles of the views of the people “out-of-doors” as well as political 
tracts, campaign speeches, and other relevant sources.  But it is an 
enormous effort to piece these together, especially given that one 
might often need to begin anew as novel interpretive questions pre-
sented themselves.  It is one thing to be familiar with the entire as-
sembled corpus of legislative debates and apply them to particular is-
sues.  It is another to seek out whatever extra-legislative sources 
happen to bear upon any given interpretive question. 
Third, even if the materials were available to discern the original 
understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments, it is not at all 
clear they would be enlightening.  To describe the congressional de-
bates over the Reconstruction Amendments and accompanying legis-
lation as opaque, intricate, confusing—or tedious for that matter—is 
hardly to begin to do justice to the topic.  The times were chaotic; po-
litical strategies were in constant flux.  Politics outside the halls of 
Congress was keeping a watchful eye, but often distorting what hap-
 
 38 Id. 
 39 JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY WALK TO FREEDOM:  RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 12 n.23 (1997); see also CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE 
INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT vii (1997) (providing an analy-
sis of the ratification debates in Pennsylvania, while noting that Pennsylvania was the only 
State which preserved a complete record of the debates). 
 40 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 145 (1986). 
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pened inside.  Expecting coherence may be asking far too much.  Re-
call again the examples from the previous Part.  Unequivocally one of 
the most important questions regarding Reconstruction is that of in-
corporation.  Were the Reconstruction Amendments intended to ap-
ply the provisions of the Bill of Rights against the states?  Portions of 
them?  To what extent?  Debate over the intentions of those who 
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment on this question still is ongoing.  
There are voluminous studies, two of the most notable by Charles 
Fairman and Akhil Amar.41  The two disagree vehemently.  Though I 
have my own view of who gets the better of that debate, the end of 
controversy on this central question is hardly near. 
Fourth, even if we knew the answers, we might be loath to accept 
them.  Two examples come immediately to mind here:  the question 
of segregated public schools and the application of the equality guar-
antees of the Fourteenth Amendment along lines other than race.  
Suffice to say that no theory of constitutional interpretation that sanc-
tions school segregation or denies equality to women can be consid-
ered remotely viable today.42  There have been originalist arguments 
consistent with this realpolitik, interesting and valiant ones, but the 
consensus remains that originalists who seek to make the case for 
gender equality and school desegregation consistent with the original 
understanding are swimming upstream.43 
The difficulty in getting the Fourteenth Amendment to mean 
what is politically palatable today is apparent in one notable attempt 
at defending school desegregation that—to the extent it succeeds—
 
 41 AMAR, supra note 24, at 215–30 (advocating a theory of “refined incorporation”); Charles 
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?  The Original Under-
standing, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 138 (1949) (concluding that the historical records argue 
against total incorporation). 
 42 See Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures:  The Living Constitution, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1752 (2007) (noting that Brown has been canonized to a greater ex-
tent than explicit constitutional guarantees, such as the republican Guarantee Clause:  
“While no Supreme Court nominee could be confirmed if he refused to embrace Brown, 
he could safely confess great puzzlement about the meaning of ‘republican’ government 
and gain a seat on the bench”); see also Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Move-
ment Conflict and Constitutional Change:  The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 
1410–11 (2006) (discussing how popular belief in constitutional protections against sex 
discrimination contributed to the defeat of Professor Bork’s nomination to the Supreme 
Court). 
 43 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 559–60 (noting that most originalists do not pub-
lically challenge equal protection doctrine’s adoption of sex discrimination).  The ac-
cepted wisdom has been that Brown cannot be reconciled with an originalist approach, al-
though this has been challenged by Michael W. McConnell in Originalism and the 
Desegregation Decisions, supra note 22; regarding McConnell’s success, see Klarman, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory:  A Response to Professor McConnell, supra note 22. 
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undermines the argument for gender equality.  Taking the position 
that Brown v. Board of Education was decided correctly as an originalist 
matter, Robert Bork explained that the case involved a collision be-
tween two of the framers’ conceptions:  racial equality and school se-
gregation.  When, in our time, it became apparent the two could not 
co-exist, one had to give way.  The more general concept of “equality” 
trumped the more specific interest in segregation, Bork explained.44  
Paul Brest offered the following riposte:  if the general principle of 
equality prevailed, why not equality for, say, gays?45  Bork’s comeback:  
because it was race the framers cared about.46  Even assuming Bork 
was right (and one hardly would score him the winner of their de-
bate), where precisely does that leave women’s equality? 
No theory of constitutional interpretation can reach results plainly 
unacceptable to the polity and remain tenable.  The late lay original-
ist Raoul Berger relied on an (often contested) originalist methodol-
ogy to skewer popular understandings of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.47  But unlike many of today’s originalists, Berger was not selling 
his methodology for widespread adoption and did not have to win 
adherents.  He was free to let his inquiries take him where they led.48  
Yet, originalist interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
likely to yield troubling resolutions of some of the most trenchant so-
cial issues of our time, issues on which a consensus has been hard-
fought.  As we will see, there are some possible answers to the di-
lemma posed by the disparity between original understandings and 
modern interpretations, but they are unlikely to be acceptable to 
originalists. 
B.  Integrating the Constitution 
Like a contract, or a statute, the Constitution is a document that 
can be added to over time in ways that change the original meaning 
 
 44 BORK, supra note 19, at 82. 
 45 Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy:  The Essential Contradictions of Normative Con-
stitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091 (1981). 
 46 Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
823, 828 (1986) (“The intentionalist may conclude that he must enforce black and racial 
equality but that he has no guidance at all about any higher level of generality.”). 
 47 See BERGER, supra note 30, at 364 (noting the importance of “original intention” in consti-
tutional interpretation); see also O’ NEILL, supra note 25, at 111–32 (discussing the influ-
ence of Berger’s originalist constitutional interpretation in changing the terms of the 
constitutional debate). 
 48 For example, Berger concluded that historical records “all but incontrovertibly establish 
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment excluded both suffrage and segregation 
from its reach.”  BERGER, supra note 30, at 407. 
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of the text.49  The text of our Constitution has twenty-seven amend-
ments adopted since the Founding.  Although several of those were 
technical amendments—for example to fix things plainly wrong with 
the presidential selection process—others were of far broader import.  
Interpreting the Constitution requires developing an understanding 
not only of the original meanings, but how those meanings are 
pieced together into one coherent whole, what Reva Siegel has called 
“synthetic interpretation.”50  Yet, interpretive theory—including ori-
ginalism—largely is lacking in an approach to the problem of consti-
tutional integration. 
Sometimes integrating text can be a simple matter.  For example, 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly overrides the “three 
fifths” clause of Article I, Section 2.  Before adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, those in slavery counted for three-fifths of other 
persons for purposes of congressional apportionment; after ratifica-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment there was no more chattel slavery, 
and those formerly in slavery counted as whole persons.  (Section 2 
goes on to say, however, that if the vote was denied under certain 
conditions to adult males in the state, then the apportionment was 
reduced accordingly.) 
But piecing together amendments with prior aspects of the Con-
stitution’s text is not always such a mechanical endeavor.  Consider, 
for example, the relationship of the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Fourteenth.  Adopted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Chisholm v. Georgia,51 the Eleventh Amendment essentially says States 
cannot be sued in federal courts for money damages.52  Although this 
 
 49 See Balkin, supra note 27, at 490 (arguing that constitutional interpretation must take into 
account how the Constitution’s structural principles changed as it was amended over 
time). 
 50 See Siegel, supra note 17, at 966–68 (2002) (applying the idea of synthetic interpretation 
to the Court’s decision in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), in which Fourteenth 
Amendment principles were infused into the Fifth Amendment, and arguing that the Ni-
neteenth Amendment should similarly inform modern interpretations of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause). 
 51 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that federal courts had the authority to hear cases 
against States by private citizens). 
 52 Chisholm was met with considerable surprise, and a constitutional amendment to overrule 
Chisholm was introduced in Congress only two days after the Court issued its decision.  
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 978–79 (5th ed. 2003).  Or at least this is the common story.  But see id. at 
979 n.2 (summarizing diverse interpretations of the public reaction to Chisholm, including 
scholarship which suggests that the reaction was fairly muted).  In its final form, the Elev-
enth Amendment states:  “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
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statement does not begin to capture the nuance of the Court’s Elev-
enth Amendment doctrine, it is a fair enough summary of how the 
Court came to interpret the Amendment over time.53  The problem is 
that the Fourteenth Amendment by its terms is a direct command to 
the States, and Section 5 of that Amendment allows for congressional 
enforcement.  What then to do if Congress, pursuant to its Section 5 
power, opens States up to claims for money damages in the federal 
courts?  Is such legislation valid under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
or invalid under the Eleventh Amendment? 
When confronted with the question in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the 
Court adopted a sort of last-in-time rule for constitutional interpreta-
tion, at least as it applied to this particular issue.  As the Court ex-
plained: 
But we think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state 
sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforce-
ment provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In that section 
Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce “by appropriate legis-
lation” the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
themselves embody significant limitations on state authority.  When Con-
gress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legislative authority 
that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising 
that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose 
other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.  
We think that Congress may, in determining what is “appropriate legisla-
tion” for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials 
which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.54 
This interpretation might seem entirely sensible.  Not only did the 
Fourteenth Amendment follow the Eleventh, but—as the Court indi-
cates—the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in a nationalistic en-
vironment quite different from the states’ rights feelings that moti-
vated the Eleventh Amendment.55  Radical Republicans frequently 
pointed to the war as changing the basic assumptions underlying the 
federal system.  “I had in the simplicity of my heart, supposed that 
‘State rights’ being the issue of the war, had been decided,” declared 
 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 53 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 205–06 (3d ed. 
2006) (discussing how Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has been guided, in part, by 
the Supreme Court’s concern about federal courts forcing state governments to pay 
money damages). 
 54 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (citation omitted). 
 55 Id. at 454–56 (drawing on a line of cases in which the Court viewed the Civil War 
Amendments as intended to limit the power of the States and enlarge the power of Con-
gress). 
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the Radical Republican Richard Yates of Illinois in Congress in 1866.56  
Another Radical colleague agreed:  “[h]itherto we have taken the 
Constitution in a solution of the spirit of State rights.  Let us now take 
it as it is sublimed and crystallized in the flames of the most gigantic 
war in history.”57 
And, indeed, this notion that national rights trumped state powers 
played a powerful role in resolving interpretive tensions between the 
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments that were regularly presenting 
themselves during the Gilded Age and the Lochner era that followed.  
For example, at the turn of the nineteenth century States adopted 
regulatory measures—such as ceilings on railroad rates—that many 
private interests believed contravened Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees.  Those interested sued in federal court to restrain state legis-
lation, naming state officials as defendants.58  Once again, these state 
officials demurred, arguing they were immune from suit under the 
Eleventh.  Ex parte Young, for example, involved a titan clash between 
railroad interests that sought access to the federal courts to challenge 
rate regulation, and the State of Minnesota, which preferred to liti-
gate in its own courts.59  Young, the Attorney General of the state, said 
he could not be sued as a proxy for the state, offering up the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment, prior precedents, and the general logic of 
federalism.60  But the district judge in the case, ruling Young indeed 
could be sued, said that logic compelled understanding the Four-
teenth Amendment as trumping the Eleventh in this situation.  
“There must be some way to enforce that provision of the Constitu-
tion,” he said, referring of course to the Fourteenth Amendment.61  
The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, in an opinion that 
simply rested on the now-famous fiction that “the sovereignty of the 
State” was not really involved “where the state official . . . is about to 
 
 56 CURTIS, supra note 40, at 55 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 99 
(1866)). 
 57 CURTIS, supra note 40, at 48 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1866)). 
 58 See, e.g., Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (upholding an injunc-
tive suit against the state attorney general and the railroad commission regarding rates); 
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891) (allowing a suit against a state official re-
garding the constitutionality of a land use regulation). 
 59 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  See generally, Barry Friedman, The Story of Ex parte Young, in 
FEDERAL COURTS STORIES (Vicki Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., forthcoming 2009) (giving 
a historical background to the case and noting that its “implicit message” is that “when a 
state law is challenged as unconstitutional, adjudication of the constitutionality of that law 
ought not to be left to the state courts”). 
 60 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 132. 
 61 Perkins v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 155 F. 445, 447 (C.C.D. Minn. 1907). 
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commence suits, which have for their object the enforcement of an 
act which violates the Federal Constitution.”62 
In truth, though, the Court hardly hewed closely to its last-in-time 
view of constitutional interpretation, even with regard to the Eleventh 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  Rather, throughout the Gilded Age, 
reconciling the two provisions gave the Court fits in ways that still 
make coherent interpretation of the case law difficult today.  In one 
sense the problem the Court faced was posed by the Eleventh 
Amendment’s relationship to the body of the Constitution that pre-
ceded it.  Article I, Section 10 of the original Constitution contains 
the Contracts Clause, which prohibits States from impairing the obli-
gations of contracts.  When, in the years after Reconstruction, many 
states and municipalities were sued for refusing to pay their own 
debts, they frequently raised Eleventh Amendment defenses to those 
actions.63  But critics argued that that the Eleventh Amendment itself 
was an invalid change to the Constitution precisely because it could 
not be squared with the Contract Clause of Article I.64  How could 
one enforce contracts, critics asked, if there was allowed no suit in 
(federal) court to do so?  The Eleventh Amendment, the editors of 
the Nation suggested in 1879, “has been a standing reproach to the 
nation ever since, inasmuch as it has been a continuous cover for fla-
grant injustice.”65  Although the Supreme Court never explicitly ac-
cepted the argument that the Eleventh Amendment altered the Con-
tracts Clause in some unacceptable way,66 anyone familiar with the 
odd course of Eleventh Amendment jurisdiction knows well that im-
plicitly the thrust of the argument proved somewhat persuasive.  Ac-
cordingly, the Court rendered interpretations of the Eleventh 
 
 62 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 167. 
 63 See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES:  THE ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 58 (1987) (noting that Louisiana and North Carolina 
together repudiated debts of twenty-seven million dollars). 
 64 Id. at 66–67 (noting that maligned bondholders who brought suit under this theory were 
unable to overcome the Eleventh Amendment bar); see Cunningham v. Macon & Bruns-
wick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446 (1883); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883). 
 65 The Federal Judiciary and the Repudiators, 705 NATION 5 (1879) (asserting that “[n]othing 
could be more unfair in practice or reprehensible in principle. . . . [The Eleventh] 
amendment impaired the symmetry of the Constitutional plan as first adopted. . . . At this 
day, by reason of it, there are obligations of States, issued under their broad seals, out-
standing to the amount of one hundred and eighty millions of dollars that are dishon-
ored, and no legal remedy exists to their injured holders.”). 
 66 In fact, the idea that the Constitution simply cannot be amended in particular ways never 
has gained as much attention in the United States as it has abroad.  For example, the 
German Constitution makes certain provisions unamendable.  Vicki C. Jackson, Constitu-
tions as “Living Trees”?  Comparative Constitutional Law and Interpretive Metaphors, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 921, 933 n.47 (2006). 
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Amendment that permitted suits in federal court over government 
debts, for example by holding that the Amendment applied to States 
but not state officials, or by concluding that States could not be sued, 
but municipalities could.67  Thus, later-in-time amendments appar-
ently can be ignored when inconvenient or difficult to reconcile with 
pre-existing constitutional ideals. 
Conversely, the Court has been willing to find the original text al-
tered even when no later text clearly did so, an issue brought to the 
fore by the Court’s gender equality decisions.  As we have seen, wom-
en’s equality was hardly the goal of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.68  Yet, the Court in United States v. Morrison relied on 
cases like Reed v. Reed and Craig v. Boren for its now apparently unchal-
lengeable position that the Fourteenth Amendment does cover dis-
crimination against women.69  However, just as the Court was render-
ing decisions like Reed v. Reed, Frontiero v. Richardson, and Craig v. 
Boren, drawing women into the equal protection fold, the country was 
outright rejecting the Equal Rights Amendment, which would have 
done so explicitly.  The Court’s decisions are remarkably silent as to 
how this transformation in the constitutional meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment came to pass.  Reed plausibly applies the general 
mandate of equal protection to a case of gender discrimination, and 
says little else.70  By Craig, though, the Court was plainly applying 
heightened scrutiny to such claims of gender equality—a scrutiny 
that after decisions like VMI71 and Mississippi School for Women72 may 
indeed be strict—with no explanation of what changed the Constitu-
 
 67 See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not prohibit a suit against a county); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857–58 (1824) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar 
suit against state officers). 
 68 See supra notes 13–16, 24 and accompanying text. 
 69 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000) (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) [here-
inafter VMI] and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976), as part of case law establish-
ing that gender discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause unless it “serves ‘im-
portant governmental objectives and . . . the discriminatory means employed’ are 
‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives’”). 
 70 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (stating that “[t]o give a mandatory preference to 
members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination 
of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbid-
den by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 71 518 U.S. 515 (holding that the Virginia Military Institute’s male-only admissions policy 
violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 72 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that it was violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause to deny men admission to an all-female nursing school). 
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tion since the adoption of the Fourteenth and the failure of the 
Equal Rights Amendment.73 
Reva Siegel has provided an explanation for the gender equality 
decisions, which is rooted at least in part in clause integration.74  Sie-
gel’s primary argument rests in the success of social movements’ 
claims for women’s equality, an interpretive technique with which I 
have considerable sympathy.  Still, she recognizes the benefits if not 
the necessity of having an available constitutional text, and she has 
one to which she can point:  ratification of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, extending the franchise to women.75 
Not everyone will buy the argument that the Nineteenth Amend-
ment amended the Fourteenth, thereby expanding the mandate of 
the latter into the area of women’s equality.  But some explanation is 
needed for the well-accepted conclusion of the Morrison Court.  Ori-
ginalists in particular need an argument on this point, but they are 
largely at sea in explaining the equality decisions.76  Indeed, there is 
not really an originalist theory of constitutional integration of any 
sort. 
C.  Rejecting Constitutional Amendments 
For the most part, constitutional interpreters seem to favor a me-
thodology that constructs a straight story from the adoption of consti-
tutional text to the present, with few deviations in meaning.  All rec-
ognize, of course, that there have been detours from the one true 
path—no matter how that path is defined.  Liberals tend to believe 
the Lochner era was one such, with the correct course re-established 
 
 73 In Craig, the Court relied primarily on Reed v. Reed and subsequent cases to justify height-
ened scrutiny; although the Court condemned “‘archaic and overbroad’ generalizations” 
about the sexes, it did not root this objection in either constitutional text or original un-
derstanding.  429 U.S. at 198. 
 74 Siegel, supra note 17, at 966 (defining the method of synthetic interpretation as “inter-
pret[ing] one clause or provision in light of another—attending especially to relations 
among different parts of the Constitution as they are interpreted or amended over 
time”). 
 75 Id. at 949–51. 
 76 Originalist scholars often fall back on the argument that sex discrimination is similar to 
race discrimination.  For example, Steven Calabresi argues that sex can viewed as a 
“caste” for discrimination purposes in his article The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme 
Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law:  An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1097, 1120–21 (2004).  Taking a different approach, John Harrison hints that the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause could be used to protect against sex discrimination in Recon-
structing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, supra note 26, at 1460–61. 
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after the New Deal fight.77  Some conservatives, on the other hand, 
see the New Deal settlement itself as a departure from the original 
constitutional meaning.78  The general point, though, is that in inter-
preting the Constitution, deviation is to be minimized; a coherent 
story should be told from start to finish, and over-rulings of Supreme 
Court decisions should be relatively few. 
Unfortunately, that’s not how it is with actual American constitu-
tional history, which often has charted a more winding course in 
which even foundational moments can be rejected at a later time.  
Reconstruction stands as paradigmatic here.  Not long after the adop-
tion of the Civil War Amendments, and much embellishment of them 
in statutory text, the country lost its patience with the entire en-
deavor.  It turned its back on the freedmen, and on most of the com-
mitments to them that had been extended during the tumultuous 
years following the Civil War.79 
Commonly employed interpretive methodologies find it difficult 
to grapple with such sharp turns in the constitutional path.  There is 
one sentence in United States v. Morrison that is remarkable in this re-
gard.  Justifying the state action requirement that spells the death to 
the private right of action under the Violence Against Women Act, 
the Court states that “[s]hortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted, we decided two cases interpreting the Amendment’s provi-
sions,” one of which was The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).80  
And that case, explained the Court, barred legislation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment aimed at private conduct.81 
The Court’s “shortly after” claim is breathtaking in its disregard of 
actual historical events.  The Civil Rights Cases came the better part of 
a generation after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.82  Dur-
ing that fifteen-year period, it is fair to say that political ideals in the 
United States were turned on their head as much as virtually any oth-
er period in history. 
 
 77 See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS 259 (1998) (exploring the 
idea that “the New Deal Court was simply reestablishing itself in the main stream of 
American constitutional law”). 
 78 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 5, 7–12 
(1988) (critiquing post-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence as “tragic”). 
 79 For an account of this, claiming that the rejection of Reconstruction could be considered 
its own constitutional “moment,” see Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional 
Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115 (1994).  For Bruce Ackerman’s response, see 
ACKERMAN, supra note 77, at 471 n.126. 
 80 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000). 
 81 Id. 
 82 The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, while the Civil Rights Cases were de-
cided in 1883.  109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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Between the onset of Reconstruction and the Gilded Age that fol-
lowed, rapid social change caused the country to turn its back on the 
original commitments of the Civil War Amendments with startling 
speed.  The Civil War jump-started America’s industrial revolution, 
altering forever the nature of economic life in the United States.  In 
the middle of all this economic transition, the Crash of 1873—
occasioned by a severe tightening of credit when the banking house 
of Jay Cooke failed—left the country in dire economic straits.83  By 
the time of the disputed Hayes-Tilden election of 1876, the country 
had altogether tired of the expense and effort required to protect the 
freedman, and was ready for an entirely new course.  “We have 
tried . . . constant partisan intermeddling from Washington and 
bayonets ad lib.  The malady,” explained the Springfield Republican, 
“does not yield to the treatment.  Let us now try . . . a little vigorous 
letting alone.”84  Hayes’s victory was a negotiated deal that allowed the 
Republicans to hold the White House so long as military control of 
the South came to an end.  Reconstruction was not only over by 1877, 
but the state of affairs on the ground was moving quickly to reverse its 
course.  Redeemer governments in the South harshly oppressed 
blacks, driving them from office, depriving them of the franchise, 
and snuffing out the promise of Reconstruction.85  By the 1890s the 
job was done.  The 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,86 in which the 
Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to State-enforced racial apart-
heid, ran comfortably in the current of a sharply-altered understand-
ing of what Reconstruction was supposed to accomplish. 
This sharp change of sentiments was echoed time and again in 
popular “huzzahs” as the Court dismantled Reconstruction.  Even as 
the Congress was debating the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Chicago 
Tribune, which had supported abolition during the war, was asking “Is 
it not time for the colored race to stop playing baby?”87  In 1875, the 
Court decided United States v. Cruikshank, involving criminal prosecu-
tions by the federal government of those responsible for the slaugh-
ter of several hundred blacks in the fight for political control of Lou-
isiana.88  The Court overturned the convictions, adopting a very 
 
 83 See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:  AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–
1877, at 512–63 (1988) (describing the economic depression that began in 1873). 
 84 REPUBLICAN, Jan. 11, 1875, quoted in WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1869–1879, at 280 (1979). 
 85 See FONER, supra note 83, at 588–98 (detailing the various methods used to dismantle the 
Reconstruction state and subordinate blacks). 
 86 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 87 The Nigger School, CHI. TRIB., June 8, 1874, at 4. 
 88 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
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limited view of Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments.89  Another journal with abolitionist roots, New 
York’s Independent, responded to the Court’s decision in Cruikshank 
saying “[t]o assume State powers as the method of punishing and 
preventing wrong in the States would be an experiment with our po-
litical system that had better be omitted. . . . Southern ques-
tions . . . must be left to the States themselves . . . .”90  When, in the 
1883 Civil Rights Cases, the Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 
1875, the New York Times joined most of the popular press in com-
mending the Justices:  “The judgment of the court is but a final chap-
ter in a history full of wretched blunders, made possible by the sin-
cerest and noblest sentiment of humanity . . . .”91 
The practical undoing of Reconstruction poses a further chal-
lenge today because with it came a swift return to antebellum federal-
ist principles.  Decisions limiting the impact of the Civil War 
Amendments and accompanying legislation were necessary, the 
Court explained, because the framers of the Reconstruction 
Amendments simply had not intended to alter the settled under-
standings of national-state relations.  The Slaughterhouse Court re-
jected the butcher’s claims, saying to do otherwise “radically changes 
the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal govern-
ments to each other and of both those governments to the people.”92  
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court announced that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did “not invest Congress with power to legislate upon 
subjects which are within the domain of State legislation.”93 
To present the Civil Rights Cases as a contemporary interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, as the Court did in Morri-
son, is simply little disingenuous.  It is difficult to understand it as any-
thing other than a reflection of the impulse to tell constitutional his-
tory in a straight path.  Rather than persuading knowing readers on 
this count, however, the decision in Morrison starkly demonstrates the 
difficulty posed in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment today. 
The question is what one does with constitutional principles—let 
alone constitutional text—that the country subsequently rejects.  Re-
 
 89 Id. at 555–56 (stating that the Fifteenth Amendment was not implicated and declaring 
that the Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect equal rights “was originally assumed by 
the States; and it still remains there.  The only obligation resting upon the United States 
is to see that the States do not deny the right”). 
 90 INDEPENDENT, Apr. 6, 1876, quoted in 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED 
STATES HISTORY 1836–1918, at 605 (rev. ed. 1926). 
 91 The Rights of Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1883, at 4. 
 92 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1872). 
 93 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
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construction is hardly the only example of the phenomenon, but it is 
a telling one.94  Originalists might argue, consistently with their gen-
eral methodology, that undoing constitutional text requires more 
constitutional text.95  Thus, the era of Prohibition ushered in with the 
Eighteenth Amendment properly was toppled by the Twenty-first.  
But Reconstruction, having not ever been formally undone, remains 
as it was. 
D.  Constitutional Revisionism 
It is not quite that simple, though.  Originalists no doubt would 
deny that their methodology was intended to lead to any specific out-
comes, and would insist that they interpret according to their canons 
and the chips fall where they may.  Underscoring the point, there 
certainly are originalists—Randy Barnett comes to mind—who have 
read original moments in ways that are not entirely congruent with 
the generally conservative philosophy of originalism.96  Nonetheless, it 
is a fact that originalism and conservativism often are fellow travelers, 
and no doubt originalism is attractive to many conservatives precisely 
because it seems to render results consistent with ideological com-
mitments.  There is nothing illegitimate about this; cognitive coher-
ence typically implies adopting theoretical understandings that com-
port with one’s priors as to appropriate results.  As will be apparent, 
however, if the historical aftermath of Reconstruction is taken seri-
ously, originalist interpretations are likely to diverge from certain 
conservative ideological commitments.  In short, one cannot neces-
sarily have one’s methodological cake and eat it too. 
For many originalists, the “switch in time” that followed Roose-
velt’s threat to pack the Supreme Court in 1937, and much of what 
happened thereafter to grant Congress virtually unlimited control 
over the economy, was a betrayal of originalist constitutional under-
 
 94 Another significant example occurred in the years leading up to 1937, when the country 
forced the Supreme Court to abandon long-standing notions of limited congressional 
powers in the economic realm, yet another signal that prevalent understandings of Amer-
ican federalism had undergone a sea change.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.7. 
 95 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution:  Text, Precedent, and 
Burke, 57 ALA. L. REV. 635, 686–87 (2006) (arguing that the text is far more relevant than 
precedent); McConnell, supra note 79, at 143 (arguing that without a textual amend-
ment, “the courts cannot know whether a constitutional moment has taken place until af-
ter they have acquiesced in it”). 
 96 For example, Barnett’s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment as providing 
stronger and more expansive liberty protections has been dismissed by another originalist 
as “faulty.”  Calabresi, supra note 19, at 3. 
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standings about congressional power and federalism.97  To be sure, 
most originalists are not kamikazes.  Robert Bork, for example, has 
conceded that as much as he may disapprove of the post New Deal 
expansion of regulatory authority, we just are not going to turn the 
clock all the way back.98  But not all originalists are so sanguine.  The 
Constitution in Exile movement in fact seeks a return to much of the 
New Deal doctrine.99  And those originalists who are willing to con-
cede some expansion in federal authority nonetheless disagree with 
the Court’s abandonment of property rights at the same time.100  In 
short, most originalists are fans of federalist principles that would lim-
it national authority and empower the States.  And they believe in the 
protection of property rights. 
The difficulty is that the “original understanding” to which these 
originalists would return is itself highly dubious at best if not wholly 
fictive.  It is far more a product of post-Reconstruction revisionism 
than of any original Founding moment.  And that revisionism is Ja-
nus-faced:  while it might support certain property-rights claims of 
conservatives, it does so at the expense of their more general reliance 
on principles of federalism in limiting national power. 
The cases decided by the Supreme Court in the immediate after-
math of the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments granted lit-
tle protection for property rights.  In 1873, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 
the Court made a point of saying the Fourteenth Amendment was 
about protecting the rights of the freedmen, and it strongly rejected a 
claim by New Orleans butchers that a Louisiana law creating a butch-
ering monopoly violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.101  
Evoking the words of Justice White in Bowers v. Hardwick, one might 
say that the Slaughterhouse Court found claims of this sort of protec-
tion of property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment altogether 
 
 97 See e.g., Epstein, supra note 78 (criticizing the change in constitutional interpretation that 
began in 1937); Bernard H. Siegan, Rehabilitating Lochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 453 
(1985) (examining the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluding 
that Lochner was consistent with the framers’ intent). 
 98 See BORK, supra note 19, at 216 (“[T]he consolidation of all power at the federal level is 
too firmly entrenched and woven into our governmental practices and private lives to be 
undone.”). 
 99 See Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2002–2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7 (criticiz-
ing the Court’s expansive reading of the Commerce Clause and urging the revival of the 
nondelegation doctrine); Jeffrey Rosen, Justice Thomas’s Other Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
17, 2005, at E44 (quoting Constitution in Exile defender Michael Greve:  “I think what is 
really needed here is a fundamental intellectual assault on the entire New Deal edifice.”) 
100 BARNETT, supra note 26, at 222–23. 
101 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72–73 (1872) (stating that the main purpose of the Reconstruction 
Amendments was to protect people of African descent). 
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“facetious.”102  In Munn v. Illinois, in 1877, the Court gave way a little 
bit:  it suggested that state regulation of property might be subject to 
some challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment, but not so if the 
property was devoted to the “public interest.”103  The Court endowed 
the term “public interest” with such a capacious meaning, however, 
including within it railroads and grain elevators, that the majority 
opinion elicited a strong dissent from that longtime advocate for 
property rights Stephen Field.104  But the Munn majority was non-
plussed:  “For protection against abuses by legislatures the people 
must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”105 
Over the next fifty years or so, though, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment experienced a remarkable revival, not to help the freedmen, 
but as a vehicle for the protection of property interests.  One can ex-
plore this expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s jurisdiction 
with an internal (doctrinal) story or an external (political) one, but 
the upshot was the same either way.106  By the turn of the twentieth 
century the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment that initially had 
been closed off to property rights and corporate interests by the 
Slaughterhouse and Munn Courts were wide open for business, which 
was bustling.  During the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, the Su-
preme Court went on a binge of striking down state laws to further 
the interests of property and capital.107  Their weapons were varied, 
among them the Dormant Commerce Clause, substantive due proc-
ess under the Fourteenth Amendment, and a sort of common law 
constitutionalism that was applied in diversity cases and cases on di-
rect review.  The lower federal courts became a congenial home for 
 
102 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). 
103 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125–26 (1877). 
104 Id. at 140 (Field, J., dissenting) (“If this be sound law . . . all property and all business in 
the State are held at the mercy of a majority of its legislature.”) 
105 Id. at 134 (majority opinion). 
106 For an exploration of both types of stories, see generally SUPREME COURT DECISION-
MAKING:  NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman, 
eds., 1999). 
107 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at chs. 5–6 (describing how the Court struck down many 
state laws during this period); Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and 
the Development of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1272–79 (2000) (dis-
cussing how the Court’s invalidation of state business regulations through general consti-
tutional law in diversity suits, see, e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175 (1863), 
paved the way for Lochner-era invalidation of economic regulations on Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds, see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Lou-
isiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)). 
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corporations seeking protection from state regulation and private sui-
tors.108 
The difficulty, of course, lies in justifying this activism by the fed-
eral courts in the name of property rights.  There is a body of histori-
cal scholarship that ties these decisions—at least the substantive due 
process ones—to the Constitution, largely by arguing that the Four-
teenth Amendment itself incorporated the “free labor” ideology of 
the antebellum era.109  These “Lochner revisionists” thus seek to ex-
plain how the now-reviled decisions of the Lochner era actually had a 
firm basis in pre-existing jurisprudence.  Although the Lochner revi-
sionists are surely correct that the Lochner era decisions had jurispru-
dential roots in the Gilded Age, there still is room to question wheth-
er they necessarily can be tied to the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
For present purposes, though, the important point is that no mat-
ter where one comes down on the question of the legitimacy of sub-
stantive due process in service of property rights, it is extremely diffi-
cult to bless the property rights doctrine as an originalist matter and 
still hold firm to antebellum understandings of federalism.  The 
Gilded Age Court was wildly admired by business and property inter-
ests for what it was doing to preserve the sanctity of property under 
the Constitution.  The Court plainly did so, however, at the expense 
of state autonomy and constitutional federalism.  The opponents of 
the Gilded Age Court were themselves the ones interested in protect-
ing states’ rights.  They frequently denounced the Court for tram-
pling on state sovereignty.110 
By the time of the Supreme Court’s fight against the New Deal, 
though, the Supreme Court was adopting both a pro-property rights 
 
108 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.5 (discussing the federal judiciary’s relative friendliness 
to corporations, as compared to state judiciaries); Howard Gillman, How Political Parties 
Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas:  Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 519 (2002) (describing how business interests flocked to the fed-
eral courts). 
109 For an overview of Lochner revisionism, see Barry Friedman, The History of the Counterma-
joritarian Difficulty, Part Three:  The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1397–1402 
(2001); see also William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor:  Labor and the Law in the 
Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 783 (“[T]he abolitionist talked about the freedom of the 
Northern worker in terms of self-ownership, that is, simply not being a slave, being free to 
sell his own labor.”). 
110 See Current Topics, 18 CENT. L.J. 281, 282 (1884) (declaring that no one but those repre-
senting corporate interests “can look upon this invasion of the domain of the State judici-
ary with any thing but regret”); Notes, 27 AM. L. REV. 382, 396 (1893) (charging the judges 
who decided Gelpcke with “plain usurpation”); William M. Meigs, Decisions of the Federal 
Courts on Questions of State Law, 8 S. L. REV. 452, 478 (1882) (calling Gelpcke “a most radical 
departure from precedent and principle”). 
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interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a vision of federal-
ism as a limit on congressional power.  As my colleague William Nel-
son once put it to me, the New Deal was the first time in history that 
the Court was forced to choose between business and the federal 
government.  It chose the former and the rest is history.  (As the 
Court ultimately learned, it is not wise to bite the hand that sustains 
you.)  This period, prior to the Court’s “switch” in 1937 and thereaf-
ter, is precisely the time to which originalists would like to return. 
Bruce Ackerman provides an argument that grounds both prop-
erty rights and limited state power decisions in the Constitution.  He 
synthesizes the original Founding and Reconstruction to arrive at the 
conclusion that Lochner era protection of property rights was appro-
priate, because those rights are found in the original Constitution 
and Reconstruction properly is interpreted to require a nationalist 
protection for all such rights.111  On the other hand, he says, Recon-
struction did not alter the scope of national power generally when 
constitutionally-protected rights were not at issue, so that next shift 
had to wait until the New Deal.112 
Originalists undoubtedly will cotton to Ackerman’s thesis—but 
only the first two-thirds of it!  Ackerman famously goes on to argue 
that when it comes to the question of national power, the New Deal—
and particularly the Court fight—signaled a national referendum in 
favor of what was effectively an amendment to the Constitution to 
give Congress much broader sway in the economic realm.113  Original-
ists are hardly excited to sign on to this aspect of Ackerman’s theory, 
which recognizes a momentous constitutional change occurring 
without textual amendment.  As noted above, most originalists seem 
willing to concede the impossibility of returning to a pre-New Deal 
understanding of national power, even though on methodological 
grounds they cannot agree that a non-textual amendment actually al-
tered the Constitution. 
Ackerman’s “one-two synthesis” is provocative and has a lot to it, 
but it is a little bit too tidy to really unite originalist methodology and 
conservative views of constitutional meaning.  Even if one acknowl-
edges that the Constitution was changed during Reconstruction in 
just the way he says, i.e., to nationalize certain rights, Ackerman also 
recognizes that the country turned its back on those commitments 
 
111 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 100–01 (1991). 
112 Id. at 102–03. 
113 ACKERMAN, supra note 77, at 279–311. 
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shortly thereafter.114  How can we be so certain that the country re-
jected only part of the original meaning of the Reconstruction 
Amendments and not all of it?  As we already have seen, in 1873 the 
Slaughterhouse Court narrowly interpreted the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to exclude from its ambit precisely those sorts of property 
claims that would become dominant in the later years.115  Yet, Slaugh-
terhouse was met with plaudits from the country at large.116  So why did 
the entire notion of nationalized rights not crumble as Reconstruc-
tion did?  Further, when the Court did begin to recognize Fourteenth 
Amendment property rights claims in the coming decades, there was 
a hue and cry about it precisely because those decisions held insuffi-
cient regard for state autonomy.117 
As a matter of fact, originalists seem split on whether Ackerman’s 
account of the Gilded Age even is correct.  Some, those who put large 
stock in property rights, appear to agree.118  But many others, per-
fectly cognizant of the fact that those decisions were grounded in sub-
stantive due process—the same vehicle that protects abortion rights 
and the rights of homosexuals—demur.  Robert Bork, for example, 
attacks Lochnerizing relentlessly, though Ackerman would defend it 
on originalist grounds.119 
My own view is that the story is more textured, and—
accordingly—difficult to interpret as justifying either Ackerman’s or 
the originalists’ “one-two” synthesis.  Following the collapse of Recon-
 
114 Id. at 471–74 n.126 (recognizing that American institutions increasingly failed to protect 
black Americans after Reconstruction but rejecting McConnell’s claim that this back-
turning constituted a constitutional moment of its own). 
115 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
116 See WARREN, supra note 90, at 543–46 (documenting broad support among the major 
newspapers for the Court’s decision). 
117 See Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
943, 966 (1927) (“The Court has acknowledged great regard for the legislatures’ conclu-
sions of fact and opinion, but its action often belies its words, and even its own members 
accuse it of abuse of authority.”); The New York Labour Law and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
21 L.Q. REV. 211, 212 (1905) (criticizing the Court for treating the state legislature as if it 
were “an inferior court which has to give affirmative proof of its competence”). 
118 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 26, at 253–54 (advocating equal protection of enumerated 
and unenumerated rights); David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York:  A Centennial Retro-
spective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005) (placing Lochner in historical context); Epstein, su-
pra note 78, at 13–18 (pointing out the significance that Lochner concerned freedom of 
contract); Siegan, supra note 97 (explaining the historical background to Lochner and 
stating that the case was consistent with an original interpretation of the Constitution). 
119 BORK, supra note 19, at 46–49 (1990) (describing Allgeyer and Lochner as “unjustifiable as-
sumptions of power”); see also Calabresi, supra note 19, at 13 (“We must never forget that 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, Lochner v. New York, and Korematsu v. United States were all substantive 
due process decisions where the Court was guided by its own twisted ideas about what 
‘human dignity’ required.”). 
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struction, the country’s commitment to nationalized rights was not 
strongly apparent again until the defeat of FDR’s Court-packing plan 
in 1937.  One of the chief arguments against Roosevelt’s plan was that 
there were constitutional rights that would be in jeopardy but for the 
existence of a Supreme Court independent enough to protect 
them.120  By then, however, people were thinking primarily of what we 
today call “civil rights,” not property rights.121  Even that commitment 
did not really flower until the 1960s.  (By the same token, property 
rights died a sharp death after the New Deal, something Ackerman 
explains as part of the New Deal non-textual amendment).122 
The picture is just as confused (or nuanced, depending on how 
you want to see it) on the federalism side of the equation.  The same 
Gilded Age Court that protected property rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment also based many of its pro-business decisions on 
the Dormant Commerce Clause.  This surely was a question of na-
tional powers, not rights, of the sort that Ackerman generally would 
bracket, leaving for resolution in the New Deal years.  To be sure, 
there is a story one can tell of the Gilded Age Justices struggling to 
find the right balance between state and national authority in a rap-
idly changing economy.  The Court’s “original package” cases regard-
ing state authority to limit the importation of alcohol is a good ex-
ample of this.123  It also shows the Court trying to navigate its way on a 
difficult issue of heightened public attention. 
The problem for originalists is that these sorts of nuanced stories 
are grounded as much in doctrinal development—what David Strauss 
calls common law constitutionalism—and subsequent history as they 
are in foundational moments.124  The winding case law departs quite a 
 
120 See Editorial, Not Safe for Democracy, DES MOINES REG., in Opinions of the Nation’s Press on 
Court Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1937, at 10 (declaring that “executive aggrandizement is 
not safe for democracy”).  See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.7 (describing public 
concerns about civil liberties in the face of the court packing plan). 
121 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch.7 (discussing popular concern over civil liberties dur-
ing the New Deal court fight). 
122 ACKERMAN, supra note 77, at 280 (arguing that “Lochner is no longer good law because the 
American people repudiated Republican constitutional values in the 1930’s, not because 
the Republican Court was wildly out of line”). 
123 See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 124–25 (1890) (holding that the Commerce Clause bars 
Iowa from restricting the sale of imported alcohol that remains in its original package 
without Congressional authorization).  Shortly thereafter, the Court upheld the Wilson 
Act of 1890, which authorized states to regulate the import of liquor across their borders, 
In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891); the Court later carved out an exception for out-of-
state mail-order liquor sales. Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 452–53 (1898). 
124 See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877 (1996) (describing the “common law approach to constitutional interpretation”); 
David Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001) 
 
1232 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:5 
 
bit from the original meaning.  (Alternatively, sometimes the original 
meaning is initially obscure, and gets worked out in the intervening 
years.)  The reality is that history does not move in the comfortable 
forward path that most constitutional interpretation asks of it.  There 
are fits and starts, wrong moves, sharp turns, and serious departures.  
Legal doctrines and philosophical commitments deemed to go hand-
in-hand at the present did not in the past.  And still, some sense must 
be made of it all.  The strategy adopted most frequently by constitu-
tional interpreters of all methodological stripes and ideological 
commitments—including originalism—is of ignoring inconvenient 
portions of the story, of telling a tale that follows a straight line from 
what one imagined happened to how one wants things to be.  This 
sort of approach is difficult to square with the messy facts on the 
ground. 
E.  The Question of Rebirth 
In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held 
that segregated public schools violated the Constitution.  In resolving 
the question of segregated schools, the Court said “we cannot turn 
the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted.”125  Yet, in 
a sense it did.  The long chill begun in 1873 with Slaughterhouse, con-
firmed in 1883 with the Civil Rights Cases, and ratified in Plessy in 
1896, had ended.  The thaw had been gradual, perhaps, but by the 
end of the 1950s, and certainly by the 1960s, the “original” Recon-
struction commitment to racial equality had experienced a new birth. 
In witnessing this rebirth of the country’s commitment to racial 
equality, one can once again see the apparent impetus of constitu-
tional interpreters to tell a progressive story of constitutional fidelity.  
As the plurality in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey explained, “Plessy was wrong the day it was decided.”126  For what 
it is worth, this seems to be an impulse shared by the left and right 
alike.  In part because any theory of constitutional interpretation that 
denies basic equality on the basis of race or gender is untenable, vir-
tually all constitutional interpreters today sanctify the Court’s seminal 
race and gender decisions, which obviously find some textual support 
in the Reconstruction Amendments.  But though this impetus is un-
derstandable, it is not accurate to history to claim any clear continuity 
 
(arguing that amendments to the Constitution do not largely alter the meaning of the 
Constitution). 
125 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
126 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992). 
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from Reconstruction to the present structure of constitutional equal-
ity. 
The difficulty is that nothing ever is reborn just as it was.  It is pos-
sible, and at times admirable, to seek a grounding for the present in 
the past.  But to pretend that we simply can return or are returning 
there is to engage in the most blatant of fictions, one that does a real 
disservice to who we are as a constitutional polity. 
On the one hand, candor requires acknowledging that the coun-
try’s long deviation from the original understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment imposed enormous disabilities on African-
Americans, burdens that themselves influenced the very direction of 
subsequent American history—political and constitutional.  The 
freedmen were disenfranchised and disempowered through blatant 
chicanery and bouts of nauseating violence.127  The Republican Party 
retained its political hegemony in the aftermath of Reconstruction 
only at the expense of its breach of faith to the freedmen.  To say that 
the Constitution simply “returned” to its original rails is to deny the 
path dependence of these intervening events, to say that somehow 
the constitutional history of the nation runs entirely independently of 
its political and social history.128 
By the same token, it would be gross oversimplification to claim 
that the Court and country are now acting true to the original Four-
teenth Amendment.  For the very reasons discussed above, at present 
we are lacking of a clear understanding of what that original under-
standing even was.  We cannot know if such foundational cases such 
as the Civil Rights Cases would have been decided the way they were 
had not the country turned its back on Reconstruction.  All we can do 
 
127 See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:  RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 61–93 (2007) (describing racial discrimination and violence in the South at the 
end of the nineteenth century and the Supreme Court decisions that followed). 
128 Who can say with any certainty what would have been the impact on the country or the 
Constitution if such disenfranchisement had not occurred?  To pick but one example, 
there is at least some tentative evidence that states that adopted more of the progressives’ 
agenda during the Lochner era were those states in a greater portion of the population was 
enfranchised:  not just African Americans, but the poor, and women as well.  In turn, in 
some of the states in which judges struck down these laws on the basis of the Constitution, 
retribution was taken against the judges.  States adopted recalls of judges, of decisions, 
and supermajority voting requirements.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 25, at ch. 6. Conserva-
tives and liberals tell contending stories about what judges were doing during the Lochner 
era, but all agree it was an important time in political and constitutional history alike, 
with the two interlocking.  Yet, had the path of Reconstruction operated uninterrupted, 
this period may have looked very different. 
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is make our best effort to reconstruct the original understanding and 
transpose it to fit an entirely different world.129 
IV.  CONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION 
Where does this leave us?  In closing I’d like to make three points.  
First, that Reconstruction and its aftermath highlight the difficulty 
with originalism as an interpretive methodology.  Second, that rather 
than originalism, some synthetic understanding of constitutional his-
tory is both necessary and inevitable.  Third, that although synthesis is 
required, the nature of constitutional law, as opposed to constitu-
tional history, requires a backward-looking synthesis, one that ac-
commodates as many of the relevant events and precedents as possi-
ble, but nonetheless discards those that simply do not fit.  This third 
point is an ironic one, in that it presents some justification for ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation that insist on seeing consti-
tutional history in a linear way.  Yet, as I explain, there is a better way 
to do this “backward” fitting to a constitutional line. 
The first point, regarding the difficulties of originalism, ought to 
be well-established by this point.  Originalism, at least as commonly 
practiced, tends to be atomistic:  what is the original meaning of the 
Constitution that answers X or Y question we grapple with today?  
Originalist methodology tends to be bounded in time, as though 
there was one understanding at time T1, that answers X or Y.  But our 
Constitution has inescapably changed over time.  Even if one looks 
only to alterations in the Constitution’s actual text, and seeks the 
original understanding of those, still there must be a way of integrat-
ing those understandings, something originalists have by-and-large 
failed to do.  The real problem is that, even if it could be and were 
done properly, originalism is unlikely to yield a set of results that is 
tenable politically and palatable to the conservative impulses of origi-
nalists.  Generalizing, one ought properly to be skeptical of any in-
terpretive methodology that so consistently seems to yield results fa-
vored by any particular political ideology. 
The failings of originalism are so vast that it is the staying power of 
the methodology that begs explanation.  But the reasons for this are 
 
129 And of course changes in constitutional interpretation over time need not reflect infidel-
ity to the Constitution’s original meaning.  See generally Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, 
The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution is 
best understood as being layered with different interpretations over time); Lawrence Les-
sig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (suggesting that interpretation of 
constitutional text in different historical contexts is similar to an act of translation). 
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not so very complicated.  As Reva Siegel and Robert Post have made 
clear, originalism is not an interpretive methodology so much as it is 
an ideology.130  So long as originalism proves useful to that ideology 
its appeal will remain.  For what it is worth, the movement for origi-
nal understanding, while fervent, remains small.  The American pub-
lic has surely not bought into the doctrine, and on the Court it re-
solves few cases.  Nonetheless, originalist language gnaws insidiously 
around the edges, distorting doctrine in troubling ways.131  One of the 
real values of focusing on Reconstruction is that given its largely pro-
gressive tendencies, the results compelled by an originalist perspec-
tive on the Civil War Amendments may serve to undermine the me-
thodology itself.  It might collapse under its own weight. 
None of this is to say history is unimportant.  To the contrary, it is 
difficult to fathom how we could understand either ourselves or our 
Constitution without recourse to history.  And, assuredly, that history 
essentially includes the foundational moments.  But there is a lot of 
ground between obsessive focus on the foundational moment to the 
exclusion of all that follows, and an approach that takes all of history 
into account. 
As the history of the Reconstruction Amendments demonstrates, 
the only real alternative is to adopt a synthetic understanding of the 
Constitution.  One must holistically take account of the entire Consti-
tution.  And one must labor to read that document as it has changed 
over time.  Reading in this way requires taking account of both those 
principles adopted, and those rejected, in the words of Justice Har-
lan, “what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed 
as well as the traditions from which it broke.”132  To take one vivid ex-
ample, the present commitment to racial equality was not born out of 
the events of Reconstruction.  To the contrary, it had its roots in re-
vulsion to what the rejection of Reconstruction meant, particularly in 
the Jim Crow South.  It is impossible, therefore, to interpret the 
commitment to equality by looking primarily to 1868, when the rele-
 
130 See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 21. 
131 For example, the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test used to review whether police 
conduct constitutes a search, articulated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), has 
been undercut by originalist decisions, with Justice Scalia leading the way.  See, e.g., Wyo-
ming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (stating that courts should look first to 
the common law at the time of the Founding to determine whether a certain type of po-
lice search is valid, and then examine modern societal norms only if the originalist in-
quiry leaves the question unresolved); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581–85 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing against the general warrant rule for searches and in favor 
of a reasonableness inquiry based on “the protection that the common law afforded”). 
132 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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vant events are far closer at hand.  To take another example, the gra-
dual incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the States was—
again—not really a response to the original understanding of the Re-
construction Amendments.  Rather, it built upon them but re-
sponded to the felt necessities of the post-World War II era, the time 
in which incorporation primarily occurred. 
This sort of synthetic interpretation assuredly presents a wide vari-
ety of difficulties.  It is not easy to piece together all of American his-
tory, which hardly has followed one straightforward path.  It is often 
difficult to distinguish those aspects of history that represent the 
American people speaking to constitutional norms.  Bruce Ackerman 
addresses this problem with a schematized structure for identifying 
constitutional moments.  The impulse is correct, but constitutional 
change occurs upon a number of paths, not all of them as dramatic as 
those “moments” Ackerman pursues.  Although the New Deal period 
certainly represented a time in which Americans came to favor na-
tional control over the economy, then and in the coming years the 
commitment to nationalized rights also grew.  A decision like Gideon 
v. Wainwright,133 guaranteeing counsel to felony defendants, might 
have been unthinkable prior to the 1960s, but it was met by near-
universal acclaim when the Court decided the case in 1963.134  No 
constitutional “moment” sanctified Gideon; rather, it was the gradual 
process of constitutional change that any theory of constitutional in-
terpretation must recognize. 
Ultimately, though, the most intriguing lesson one can draw from 
an attempt to make sense of the Reconstruction Amendments is one 
that, ironically, runs somewhat contrary to the entire thrust of the ar-
gument to this point.  It rests in the important distinction between 
understanding constitutional history and fashioning constitutional 
law.  Synthetic though it may be, the enterprise of forging constitu-
tional law necessarily is backward-looking.  Constitutional lawyers, as 
opposed to constitutional historians, do not so much weave our his-
tory into a coherent whole as they work in reverse to reconstruct it 
 
133 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
134 See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 147–48 (1964) (discussing how twenty-three 
States submitted an amicus brief on Gideon’s side); Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajori-
tarian Hero or Zero?  Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1392 (2004) (noting that all but five States were already provid-
ing counsel to indigent defendants when Gideon was handed down); Anthony Lewis, Su-
preme Court Ruling Steps Up Legal Aid for Poor Defendants:  Legislatures, Tribunals and Bar 
Groups of Many States Are Meeting or Going Beyond Decision to Provide Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 1963, at 39 (“Reaction to the Supreme Court decision has been almost entirely 
favorable, even in states that have long resisted a counsel guarantee . . . .”). 
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into a “usable” past.  Ackerman captures this in a vivid metaphor in 
which the constitutional judges sit in the middle of a train, looking 
backward over the passing terrain, making sense of it as it recedes in 
the distance, while they decide cases. 
In deciding constitutional cases—in making constitutional law—
the judges do not have the luxury of fitting every piece of the puzzle, 
for the very reason that some pieces simply will not fit.  They must 
decide what can be coherently integrated, and what must be rejected 
or explained away.  In a sense they are like empiricists fitting a regres-
sion line to a serious of data points.  The demands of precedent re-
quire that the line be fit, even though some of the data points will fall 
far off it. 
There is a difference, however, between this sort of line-fitting, 
and a methodology that relentlessly seeks to draw a straight line be-
tween a foundational moment and the present.  For all the reasons 
set out here, the latter necessarily is artifice:  it is impossible to move 
directly from foundational moments to the present, or in reverse, ig-
noring all the inconvenient moments that have intervened.  The 
judge or scholar who seeks to synthetically develop constitutional his-
tory must take account of as many relevant points as possible.  The 
best understanding of the Constitution is one that integrates most of 
what of constitutional significance has happened throughout Ameri-
can history.  Assuredly there will be moments of sharp deviation that 
cannot be accounted for fully. But because history is path dependent, 
even those moments that seem most off the center line will have in-
fluenced other data points that do fit the story. 
The Constitution we live daily is forged of experience.  “[W]hen 
we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the 
Constitution of the United States,” Justice Holmes explained in Mis-
souri v. Holland, “we must realize that they have called into life a being 
the development of which could not have been foreseen completely 
by the most gifted of its begetters.”135  Referring no doubt to the 
events that gave rise to the Reconstruction Amendments, which 
Holmes had witnessed first hand in the line of battle, he continued, 
“It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created 
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors 
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.”136  Thus, 
he concluded, with far more wisdom than many interpreters today, 
“The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole ex-
 
135 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
136 Id. 
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perience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years 
ago.”137 
 
137 Id. 
